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BOOK REVIEWS
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SU-
PREME COURT. By Jesse H. Choper.1 Chicago: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press. i98o. Pp. xviii, 494. $28.50.
Reviewed by Henry P. Monaghan2
I.
Imagine a cold morning early in February. Slowly sipping
coffee in an effort to awaken fully, you are reading through
the Supreme Court advance sheets. You come across the fol-
lowing brief opinion:
PER CURIAm. Fisher v. Rye Co., No. 81-I, and First
Savings Bank v. Smith, No. 81-2. These petitions for cer-
tiorari have been consolidated for disposition in a single opin-
ion. No. 8i-i challenges an Executive Order that, in an effort
to combat gender-based discrimination, requires government
contractors to adopt affirmative action programs. No argu-
ment is made that the Executive Order is authorized by stat-
ute. Concluding that the President's order could not be em-
braced by any inherent residuum of "emergency" presidential
authority, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579 (1952), the courts below held that the Executive
Order was an impermissible assertion of legislative power. In
No. 81-2, petitioner, a state-chartered institution, asserts the
invalidity of a federal statute prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of marital status in the issuance of mortgages and
other loans. Relying upon our decision in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241 (1964), and, more
fundamentally, upon the principles set forth in M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the courts below
sustained the statute as a rational exercise of the power to
regulate interstate commerce.
The petitions are granted, the judgments vacated, and the
cases remanded with directions to dismiss the complaints for
want of jurisdiction. We hold that these separation of powers
and federalism claims present non-justiciable political ques-
tions.
The central function of the courts established by Article
Im, and particularly of this Court, is to vindicate individual
liberties. History teaches that these liberties are not ade-
Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
2 Professor of Law, Boston University; Harry Kalven, Jr. Visiting Professor, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
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quately secured by our majoritarian political process. But
these liberties are not sharply implicated by either federalism
or separation of powers challenges, since it is conceded that
some governmental unit could impose the challenged restric-
tion. Essentially, therefore, the challenges in both cases are
based on conflicting assertions of political power between gov-
ernmental actors. The constitutional structure thus ordains
that such claims be adjusted in the political process, which,
we are satisfied, adequately protects both the interests of the
States and of Congress. Moreover, history teaches that judi-
cial intervention in these areas necessarily weakens this
Court's ability to discharge its principal role of vindicating
individual liberties. See generally, J. Choper, Judicial Review
and the National Political Process (i98o).
M'Culloch v. Maryland, supra, and its progeny are no
longer authoritative insofar as they assume the justiciability
of federalism issues. Our prior cases dealing with presidential
claims of constitutional authority are similarly disapproved to
the extent that they depend on the justiciability of such claims.
Of course, the courts remain free to adjudicate cases in which
the sole issue is one of statutory construction: where the Pres-
ident's sole reliance is upon statutory authority or where the
President is alleged to have acted in a manner prohibited by
statute and he concedes that such a prohibition would be
valid.
By the time you had read this imaginary opinion, your
need for coffee would, in all probability, have vanished. The
opinion's startling and intriguing thesis is the core of Professor
Choper's complex and fascinating, but ultimately frustrating,
Judicial Review and the National Political Process.
Professor Choper opens with the enduring problem of con-
stitutional theory: can judicial review be reconciled with the
fundamental presuppositions of democracy, with its emphasis
on the majoritarian political process? In the opening chapter,
he argues that neither in theory nor in practice is the Supreme
Court as democratic - as politically accountable - as the
political branches of the national government. Nonetheless he
is able to find an appropriate role for judicial review in, to
coin a phrase, "Our Democracy."' 3 To determine the nature
of this role, Choper takes an avowedly functional approach. 4
His central thesis is that judicial review is warranted only
3 "American working democracy is the grand product of the efforts and interactions
of all legal and political structures in the nation, influenced at different points with
varying intensities by the multitude of economic and social organizations that function
outside the formal system of government" (pp. io-zs).
4 Choper's approach is grounded in "the practical operation of the American
political process from the perspective of democratic theory" (p. ii).
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when the majoritarian political process cannot be assumed to
vindicate the constitutional interests at stake. In chapter 2,
Choper argues that this perspective completely justifies judicial
review in the area of civil liberties.
Chapter 3 elaborates another important thesis: judicial re-
view is a politically fragile institution, and it is, therefore, a
serious mistake to assume that the Court possesses inexhaust-
ible institutional capital. Chapters 4 and 5 build on these
themes. There Choper asserts that the Court unjustifiably
expends its capital in reviewing federalism and separation of
powers claims, neither of which clearly threaten individual
liberty. Instead, he proposes, the Court should recognize that
the constitutional system provides adequate political mecha-
nisms for maintaining a balance among the various political
organs of government and, accordingly, should deem federal-
ism and separation of powers claims inappropriate for judicial
resolution. He argues in the last chapter that a more appro-
priate role for the Court is preventing the political branches
from improperly expanding or restricting judicial review.
II.
The most provocative aspects of Choper's book appear in
these final three chapters. Here, he focuses on "constitutive"
matters, concerning the Constitution as a system for allocating
power, both between the states and the national government
and within the national government itself.5 Admitting that
constitutional questions requiring "resolution" may arise in this
context, Choper denies that they require resolution by judges.
In his thorough discussion of the "political" mechanisms avail-
able for deciding these issues, Choper provides a valuable
corrective for the myopia of those who see judicial decisions
as the only possible source of our constitutional "law." But
Choper goes much further: he denies any judicial role, even
at the margins, in either the federalism or the separation of
powers area. 6 In his view, these struggles should be treated
as nonjusticiable political questions, beyond article III's grant
of "judicial power."' 7
Choper adduces two central justifications for this sweeping
position. First, he makes the structural argument that the
5 See B. ECKHARDT & C. BLACK, THE TIDES OF POWER 1, 9 (1976).
6 Choper stresses, however, that the courts must address any independent individ-
ual liberties claims involved in these cases. See pp. 197-98, 326-30.
7 I do not pause to compare Choper's use of the "political question" terminology
with its c6rrent usage, assuming that the existing doctrine possesses coherence. See
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-23 (1976).
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constitutional interests at stake are adequately secured by the
political system. Second, Choper focuses on prudential con-
cerns, contending that judicial intervention in either area im-
poses costs on the judicial branch, diminishing the Court's
capacity to protect individual rights. Whether these justifica-
tions are sufficient to warrant so major a reorientation of our
understanding of the appropriate role of the Supreme Court
presents questions to which I now turn.
A. Federalism: The Politics of Representation
Emphasizing that "the national political process . . . is
intrinsically well-adapted to retarding or restraining new in-
trusions by the center on the domain of the states," Herbert
Wechsler long ago argued in a classic essay that the Court was
on its "weakest ground" in opposing Congress on behalf of the
states.8 Professor Choper rigorously and carefully elaborates
this insight, with impressive attention to the empirical basis
for the claim that state interests are adequately represented in
the national political process. 9
Few today would deny that the structure of "Our Feder-
alism" 10 is "political" in the sense that the actual allocation of
power between the national government and the states is de-
termined by Congress. "The radical transformation that has
occurred in the structure of 'Our Federalism' in the nearly two
centuries of our existence has emptied the concept of nearly
all legal content and replaced it with a frank recognition of
the legal hegemony of the national government." 1' The courts
are simply incapable of setting principled limits on what Con-
gress may do pursuant to its commerce, spending, and taxing
powers, or pursuant to the grants of power made by the Civil
War amendments.1 2 To be sure, National League of Cities v.
8 Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543,
558-59 (1954), reprinted in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMEN-
TAL LAW 49, 78, 8o-8i (i96i).
9 One commentator, however, has recently raised an explicit challenge to the
adequacy of the political safeguards of federalism. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 857-68 (1979).
10 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (x97i).
I Monaghan, The Burger Court and "Our Federalism," LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.,
Summer 198o, at 39, 39.
12 See id. at 4o-43. The Court could, perhaps, maintain the position of the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that private conduct cannot be reached by Congress
under the 14th amendment. But see Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional
Determinations, 4o U. CIN. L. REv. 199, 239-47 (197X); Monaghan, The Supreme
Court, z974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. I
(I975).
198o]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Usery13 stands as one attempt to draw some limits. But Usery
increasingly appears to be a constitutional sport rather than
the wellspring of significant additional restraints on the na-
tional government. 14 The real question is whether the diffi-
culty of framing meaningful constitutional limits on national
power should lead us to rethink the whole course of constitu-
tional history and treat these federalism issues as political in
the sense of being "nonjusticiable."15  Stare decisis has its
claims for me;16 Choper's case, to be persuasive, must dem-
onstrate that long-established principles work manifest incon-
venience or harm.1 7
Choper of course does not rest his case on the correctness
of a single decision like Usery. His general argument centers
on the need to protect the "fragile institution" of judicial re-
view in vindicating civil liberties. Choper points to the con-
siderable past hostility to the Court's federalism decisions,
shrewdly noting that the hostility was often a reaction to de-
cisions upholding federal legislation (pp. 129, 230-33). But
does this history prove that such reactions are likely to recur?
Choper cites no modern federalism decisions generating com-
parable responses. In one case last Term, for example, the
Court upheld federal legislation restricting the state electoral
process.1 8 I noticed no public outcry and would have been
13 426 U.S. 833 (i976).
14 See Monaghan, supra note ii, at 42. But see United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 49 U.S.L.W. 2212 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, I98o) (court relied on Usery in
holding that right-to-strike provision of Federal Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-188 (1976), interfered with New York's "integral governmental functions" in
operating public service commuter railroad and therefore did not preempt state law
prohibiting strikes by public employees).
15 Choper observes in this connection that judicial review requires a determination
of who really "speaks" for the state (pp. 181-84) - and that it is anomalous that
private parties have standing to raise federalism claims even when the state does not
object to the federal law (pp. 203-05). Cf. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1367 (1973) (until this century, federalism
issues could be litigated in private suits without appropriate federal or state officials
being notified).
16 See Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. i,
1-12 (1979).
17 Even if Choper did convincingly establish manifest harm, I wonder if he has
not carried his nonjusticiability thesis further than its underlying rationale will sup-
port. Perhaps the dynamics of the national political process adequately protect the
states, even when federal legislation has a regional bite. But the political safeguards
are not as effective when a single state claims ownership of specific property or a
specific resource as against the national government. See pp. 200-01 (discussing
United States v. California, 332 U.S. i9 (1947)). And there is no reason to assume
that the protective dynamic operates at all when the issue is whether new states -
unrepresented in Congress - must be admitted on an "equal footing" with existing
ones. See p. 194 (rejecting the "equal footing" holding of Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559 (i91')). See also B. EcKHARDT & C. BLACK, supra note 5, at 8-9.
Is City of Rome v. United States, 1oo S. Ct. 1548 (1980).
[Vol. 94
BOOK REVIEW
surprised had one been forthcoming. Constitutional battles
over the allocation of power between nation and states occu-
pied center stage for close to two centuries in our constitutional
history, but those battles are now over, and their results gen-
erally accepted. 19 Thus, it does not help Choper to argue that
any grievances felt against the Court are intense and cumu-
lative in nature (pp. 133-36, 156-61, 256-57), for no solid
basis exists for believing that the Court's modern federalism
.decisions contribute anything significant to the grievances, and
changing course now will not eliminate past grievances. Cho-
per's empirical argument that adjudicating claims of this sort
weakens the Court's ability to protect civil liberties seems
entirely speculative and out of touch with the flow of our
constitutional history. 20
Viewed in its entirety, though, Choper's "nonjusticiability"
reformulation appears deceptively harmless. Existing doctrine
imposes few federalism constraints upon Congress in full rec-
ognition that the states' interests are adequately represented in
the political process; 21 Choper simply moves this political rep-
resentation premise from the substantive to the "jurisdictional"
level. The operational consequences of the shift may alter the
results in a few marginal cases. Is this all, therefore, simply
much ado about nothing? I think not. What makes Choper's
formulation critically important is his effort to extend similar
arguments of structure and prudence to the area of separation
of powers, where the force and fit of those arguments are open
to serious doubt.
22
19 See Monaghan, supra note ii, at 39-43. The "federalism" issues currently
decided by the Court involve the reach of federal statutes. However "explosive" their
potential, even under Choper's proposal they must be adjudicated by the Court.
20 In Oregon v. Mitchell, 4oo U.S. 112 (xg7o), a badly divided Court invalidated
an act of Congress reducing the voting age in state elections to x8 years. Within six
months, the 26th amendment, designed to overturn the decision, was submitted by
Congress to the states and ratified. I am not aware that the Court suffered any loss
of institutional prestige as a result of this expeditious overruling of one of its federalism
decisions.
21 In Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (x978), Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion acknowledged that although National League of Cities "rejects the
argument that the operation of the political process eliminates any reason for reviewing
federalism-based challenges to federal regulation of the States qua States, . .. the
existence of 'political checks' [is relevant] to a determination of the proper scope of a
State's immunity from federal taxation." Id. at 456 n.13 (emphasis in original).
22 The linkage to the separation of powers area is interesting in more ways than
one. Numerous writers have noted that the concentration of actual political power
in the national government under "Our Federalism" was a precondition to the con-
centration of national governmental power in the President. See P. KURLAND, WA-
TERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 156-57 (1978); Corwin, The Dissolving Structure
of Our Constitutional Law, 20 WASH. L. REV. 185, 192 (1945), reprinted in E.
CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 141, 149 (R. Loss ed. 1976).
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B. Separation of Powers: The Politics of Countervailing
Power
Choper's complex and intriguing chapter on separation of
powers proposes that the Court "should not decide constitu-
tional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress
and the President vis-4-vis one another" (p. 263). I will confine
my remarks to perhaps the most important area in which the
thesis is applied: claims of constitutional authority made by
the President in a domestic context. Choper's nonjusticiability
approach has strong roots in the actual pattern of our consti-
tutional history. Until the Nixon presidency brought frequent
litigation of constitutionally based presidential claims, these
claims most often appeared as political - and not legal -
weapons employed by Presidents in their bargaining with Con-
gress. Few expected that these claims would be litigated be-
fore judges, and they seldom were.
Seldom - but sometimes. Historically, the Court has
passed upon two different kinds of presidential claims of con-
stitutional prerogative. The first, so far relatively rare, centers
on presidential claims to "make law" without statutory au-
thorization, or even in contravention of statute. The Steel
Seizure Case23 is the paradigm for this class of cases.24 The
second category involves congressional legislation that assert-
edly interferes with a specific zone of presidential power (for
example, the appointments power),2S or more generally, that
apparently impinges on the integrity or autonomy thought to
be reposed in the presidency by article ][[.26 Myers v. United
States27 remains the paradigm here.
Professor Choper now proposes to exclude both kinds of
23 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding seizure
of steel mills beyond presidential authority).
24 Generally, as the Steel Seizure Case illustrates, the presidential claims of power
are not located in a "specific" clause, but are said to be the inherent result of
aggregating general clauses like the grant of executive authority, U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ i, the commander-in-chief power, id. § 2, and the duty to take care that the laws
are enforced, id. § 3. See Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, B.U.L. REV., Spring
1970, at 19, 22 (special issue). Occasionally, the President can point to a clause with
obvious and specific relevance to the issue. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867) (presidential pardon nullified penalties imposed by an important
federal reconstruction act).
25 U.S. CONST. art. U[, § 2.
26 See generally Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439-55
(,977).
27 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President can remove a postmaster, a purely executive
official, at will). See also Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
(Federal Trade Commissioner, as a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative official, may
be removed by the President only on grounds specified by Congress).
[Vol. 94
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claims from the purview of "the judicial power." While courts
could still adjudicate cases in which the President relies solely
upon statutory authority for his conduct, they could not do so
if, instead, the President asserts a constitutional prerogative,
whether flowing from a specific power granted by article II,
or one claimed to be "inherent" in the presidential office.
Moreover, the shape of the presidential claim is crucial, for
the Court may determine whether Congress has forbidden the
President's conduct, if, as in the Steel Seizure Case, the Pres-
ident concedes the effectiveness of such a prohibition.
Is the justification for adopting Choper's proposal persu-
asive? Insofar as it rests upon a feared weakening of the
judicial power in the civil liberties area, I am again unper-
suaded. No evidence exists that modern, highly publicized
separation of powers cases have diminished the Court's pres-
tige. Quite the contrary; in both the Steel Seizure and the
Watergate Tapes cases, 28 the Court added to its institutional
capital. 29 Choper's largely nineteenth century historical ref-
erence cannot support his late twentieth century functional
analysis. Consequently, Choper's position must ultimately
stand or fall on the strength of presidential claims of consti-
tutional prerogative in the context of the dynamics of the
political process.
Choper's structural argument in this setting cannot rest on
the same premises advanced to justify complete judicial with-
drawal of protection from the states against Congress. Non-
justiciability in the federalism area was grounded in the per-
ception that the states are represented in the national political
process. Plainly, Congress is not institutionally "represented"
in the White House. For Choper, therefore, the protective
dynamic is quite different: the model is one of countervailing
power, with each side armed with formidable "weapons" to
protect its turf (p. 275). Choper elaborates on the congres-
sional armaments: refusal to enact legislation, including ap-
propriations; refusal to confirm appointments; and impeach-
ment (pp. 281-86).30 He does not list the power to pass
legislation forbidding the presidential conduct, an important
weapon unless the President's claim is that either a specific
28 United States v. Nixon, 48 U.S. 683 (i974).
29 Nor does the Court appear to have weakened its position in passing upon
separation of powers in a less politically charged atmosphere. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. i, 109-43 (1976) (invalidating congressional exercise of the appoint-
ments power).
30 Moreover, Choper observes that the presidency is restrained by other "checks,"
including the bureaucracy, outside interest groups, and the electorate (pp. 276-8I,
311-14).
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clause or his "inherent" power permits him to disregard even
an express statutory prohibition.
In the face of these congressional weapons, the risk of a
President's continually riding roughshod over the legislative
branch appears to be quite slim. Indeed, the relevant histor-
ical experience demonstrates the "fortunate fact" that potential
''constitutional crises" between Congress and President have
yielded to the give and take of the political process (pp. 298-
99).31 The hard fact is, after all, that no President can accom-
plish very much for very long in the absence of congressional
concurrence (p. 368).
Choper's nonjusticiability conclusion, however, generates
more serious risks in the separation of powers area than in the
federalism area. Perhaps, as Choper believes, few Presidents
will be bold enough to claim an "inherent" power of lawmak-
ing so expansive as to permit them to disregard an express
statutory command. Thus, the President's usual claim will be
that his action is not legislatively forbidden and that he has
authority to proceed until Congress acts to the contrary.
Whether, in a period - unlike the nineteenth century - of
extensive statutory law, courts will be able to distinguish
meaningfully between unauthorized and forbidden presidential
conduct remains to be seen.3 2
But even if executive claims are so limited, Choper's view
sanctions an enormous shift in political power from Congress
to the President. His nonjusticiability doctrine requires that
a court treat the presidential claim as establishing legal norms
that are enforceable by appropriate judicial orders even against
private parties.33  For practical purposes, the Court would
31 "[H]istory and experience" teach that "pitched battles ... arise only infrequently
.... [O]ur political scheme has worked" (pp. 286-87).
32 Cf. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (court of appeals
strained to find sufficient statutory authority for the President's price control program),
cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979), discussed in Case Comment, Using Federal Pro-
curement to Fight Inflation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1980).
33 Thus Choper writes that
in the renowned case of In re Debs - in which the United States sued in
federal court to prevent union officials from obstructing interstate railway and
mail transportation - as well as in the widely publicized more recent decision
in United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., the government obtained an injunc-
tion against private individuals despite the fact that no act of Congress had
expressly declared the conduct in which they had engaged to be unlawful. In
effect, the executive was itself "enacting" law as well as "enforcing" it ....
[Although the rationale was not correct,] there was no dispute that Congress
had the power to make the enjoined conduct unlawful . . . [and] the Court
should have held the issue to be nonjusticiable and granted the injunction
accordingly. (Pp. 320-21) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
I do not think that either cited case supports Choper's thesis. In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (i895), and United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293
(S.D.N.Y. 197o), have conventionally been understood as involving only the question
[Vol. 94
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treat the presidential claim as substantively valid, even though
it does not "legitimate" it. Choper insists (p. 323) that this
startling proposal cannot fairly be impeached by imaginary
horribles that would never materialize, like presidential tax
codes. But Choper's proposal is likely to affect several impor-
tant areas. Arguably, the President has already "enacted" both
a price and wage control34 and an affirmative action code
35
without adequate statutory authorization. In Choper's view,
the courts would be compelled to enforce both by injunction
simply on the President's word. Under this view we need no
longer worry whether the Court has gone too far in sustaining
wide-open congressional delegations to the President;36 no del-
egation at all is needed.
Choper's nonjusticiability doctrine, therefore, could signif-
icantly shift political power by bestowing the advantage of
inertia on presidential policy determinations. Congress would
need to act affirmatively to overturn any presidential code, a
difficult task made even more so by the virtual certainty of a
presidential veto. 37 If unable to override the veto, Congress
of the right of the Executive to sue without statutory authority - not as recognizing
a presidential power to fashion the substantive law. See, e.g., United States v.
Mattson, 6oo F.2d 1295, 1298-3oi (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to follow Brand Jewelers
on the right-to-sue issue). In Brand Jewelers, no act of Congress or executive order
was needed to make the practice of "sewer service" illegal; the court believed both
the 14th amendment and the negative impact of the commerce clause provided the
basis for standing to sue. 318 F. Supp. at 1295. But whatever the status of Debs on
the right of the executive to sue without statutory authority, its substantive theory,
an erroneous one, seems to be that the President was simply enforcing independent
substantive norms derived'from the commerce clause, various federal statutes, and
public nuisance doctrine in obtaining an injunction against the Pullman strike. See
generally United States v. Mattson, 6oo F.2d at 1298.
34 See note 32 supra.
35 Many of the current federal affirmative action programs rest upon Exec. Order
No. 12,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-x965 Compilation), as enlarged by Exec. Order No.
2I,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation), dealing with government employment
and government contracts. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 28r (1979), the
Court observed that the "origins of the congressional authority for Executive Order
11246 are somewhat obscure and have been roundly debated by commentators and
courts." 441 U.S. at 304. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall noted that the Court
did not decide that the executive order "must be founded on a legislative enactment."
Id. at 320. See generally Brody, Congress, the President, and Federal Equal
Employment Policymaking: A Problem in Separation of Powers, 6o B.U.L. REV. 239
(1980).
36 For a discussion of the delegation doctrine, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 131-34, 177 (I980); P. KURLAND, supra note 22, at 175-76.
37 Whatever the range of "inherent" executive power, the President obviously plays
an enormous role in actually shaping domestic policy because of his veto power, by
which he can force Congress to acquiesce in his views. See B. ECKHARDT & C.
BLACK, supra note 5, at 57-65; Black, Some Thoughts On The Veto, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB., Spring 2976, at 87.
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would then have to resort to other weapons, such as a refusal
to appropriate funds, in order to reclaim its authority over
national policy. Perhaps, as Choper believes, it would all
work out in the end. That seems a heroic assumption.
Like Choper, I do not believe that judges have a significant
role to play in holding the President within his constitutionally
prescribed domain. 38 Over the long haul, only Congress itself
can prevent real diminution of its power. But I am unwilling
to see the Court augment presidential power by a nonjustici-
ability doctrine that in effect validates virtually every claim of
inherent presidential authority. 39  Choper observes that few
such claims have been made. That is hardly surprising given
the existing state of the law, particularly after the Steel Seizure
Case. But if Choper is followed will that pattern endure long?
Can the Solicitor General ever fail to argue that the President's
conduct is statutorily authorized, or, in the alternative, is sup-
ported by his inherent authority when not positively forbidden
by statute? Indeed, sooner or later I would expect the Presi-
dent to insist upon an "inherent" power to disregard even
statutes when his view of the "national interest" so dictates. 40
Choper's nonjusticiability approach is flawed in another
respect: it will not have the "public relations" value he seeks.
Choper's fear is that adjudication of separation of powers
claims weakens the Court's ability to protect individual liber-
ties. Will the public really understand the difference between
holding that a presidential claim is unauthorized by statute
and holding that it is forbidden by statute? Or, more impor-
tant, the difference between treating a claim as valid and
judicially enforceable and treating it as nonjusticiable but still
enforceable? I doubt it. There is certainly very little evidence
38 In this respect, Choper rightly notes that judicial decisions have augmented
executive power as often as not (pp. 314-15).
39 While he may overstate the case, see Lacovara, Watergate: Next Time, Will We
Be So Lucky?, 88 YALE L.J. 659 (1979), Professor Kurland argues that Watergate
was the result not of "bad men," but of the unjustified aggrandizement of institutional
power in the presidency. See P. KuRLAND, supra note 22, at i8o-83. For a discussion
of the statutory power that accrues to the President when he declares an "emergency,"
see Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's Crisis Powers
with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453 (1979).
40 Space limitations preclude extensive treatment of Choper's discussion of the
"direct conflict" problem. The presidential claim is nonjusticiable; so, too, is the
congressional claim of constitutional power embodied in statute. Essentially, Choper
advocates a "hands-off" policy, with the Court not enforcing the position of either
side: "This leaves matters as they were before the Court's process was invoked
- • • " (p. 354). His elaboration of this thesis creates problems for me. Using a hands-
off approach, I do not see why a statutory assignment of duties should prevail over
a presidential effort to assign duties to a different official (pp. 349-50). Nor do I see
why a confiscatory statute should prevail over a presidential pardon (pp. 350-51).
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that the public understands in any detail what the Court does.
Moreover, so far as I can tell, the man in the street has only
one criterion: Does he like the substantive result? He shows
very little interest in institutional or process matters and no
interest at all in the "legalistic" distinction drawn by Choper.
In fact, it seems more likely that Choper's recommended hold-
ing of nonjusticiability conveys to the man in the street a
message of impotence, a message designed to weaken the Court
and diminish its prestige. In short, there seems to be no
empirical support for the assumptions about public attitudes
toward judicial work that underlie Choper's nonjusticiability
doctrine.
C. Nonjusticiability and Legitimacy
To criticize Choper is not, however, to escape his challenge:
Does judicial review serve any function in federalism and
separation of powers cases? In many cases of directly conflict-
ing assertions of power, some decisionmaker must declare a
winner. In the Watergate Tapes cases, 41 for example, it is
difficult to imagine what would have been the consequence
had the Court refused to hold for one party or the other, but
one can hardly escape, the conclusion that the toll - both in
lost public confidence in government and in inability of the
Executive and legislature to work together - would have been
heavy. Beyond that issue, a more important one remains:
How necessary is a judicially developed substantive theory for
cases involving questions about the appropriate constitutional
allocation of power? In the federalism area, Choper's nonjus-
ticiability thesis can, as I have said, be restated in substantive
terms: The Constitution remits the states to the political proc-
ess to protect their interests, and the legitimacy of expansive
exercises of federal power therefore rests on state consent. But
in the separation of powers area no such reformulation is
possible. Thus, we are left with the question whether we need
a substantive theory of presidential power, a theory that is not
the indirect product of notions of political conflict and nonjus-
ticiability. Whether the President had authority to seize the
steel mills in Youngstown, to resist the subpoenas in Nixon,
and to fire his postmaster in Myers are important questions
involving claims of constitutional right, not power. Is there
a need for a judicial ruling on the constitutional legitimacy of
the authority claimed by the President? Choper minimizes
that need, despite his elaborate demonstration that Supreme
41 For discussion of the various cases, see P. KURLAND, supra note 22.
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Court decisions have a practical impact on the choices made
by other governmental actors.
Final evaluation of Choper's approach in the separation of
powers area must await the refinement of "legitimacy" the-
ory. 42 His nonjusticiability theory alleviates the traditional
fears that the Supreme Court will illegitimately usurp political
power 4 3 but leaves the other participants in the constitutional
scheme without any source of judicial guidance on the legiti-
macy of their own actions. In a society in which judicial
declarations as to substantive constitutionality have increas-
ingly become a touchstone of legitimacy, 4 4 a sudden refusal by
the judiciary to continue its canonical role would be disquiet-
ing. The precise effect of the abandonment of this traditional
judicial role can be only a matter of speculation until further
study is made of the legitimacy of Court action in setting
guidelines for other political organs.
III.
Choper's view that the central role of the Court is to protect
individual liberties is a widely shared premise of modern con-
stitutional theory. 45 Once again, Choper's approach is tied to
the political dynamics of "Our Democracy." He begins by
narrowing his claim: neither federalism nor separation of pow-
ers claims sharply threaten individual liberties because, in the
end, the restriction could be imposed by some appropriate
political organ. Quite plainly, however, the actual allocation
among various governmental actors of the power to restrict
42 I doubt whether one can reason very clearly about the role of the Supreme
Court on the basis of perceptions, real or imagined, of popular reaction to the Court's
decisions. While that factor may have a role at the margins in a comprehensive
theory of judicial review, it plays too great a role in the theories of Choper and other
commentators. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (x962); C.
BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (xg6o). To the extent that legitimacy
theory focuses upon the problem of the appropriate "audience," my inclination is to
think in terms of elite theory. The Court's conduct must appear generally legitimate
to the judges, professors, and lawyers who follow its conduct. See sources cited in
Monaghan, supra note 15, at 1363 n.3. See also Hart, The Supreme Court, z958
Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 101 (1959)
(Court losirg respect of "first-rate lawyers').
43 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-8, at II (978) (discussing
worry about judicial legitimacy).
44 This phenomenon has been signaled in part by the decline of the political
question doctrine in domestic matters. See Henkin, supra note 7, at 617-25; cf.
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1oo2-o6 (I979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment) (foreign affairs).
4S See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J. ELy,
supra note 36, at 73-104. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at v.
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liberty is an important aspect of the overall dynamics of a
system of civil liberties. 46 But Choper's general position is, at
least in i98o, a strong one. Few modern separation of powers
violations clearly implicate individual liberty.47 With respect
to federalism, the matter is, perhaps, less clear.48 Marching
under such banners as "Participatory Democracy," many dem-
ocratic theorists have urged greater decentralization of author-
ity because large, remote, unresponsive governments diminish
the political liberty and equality of the citizen. 49 For both the
Supreme Court and Choper, nothing in the constitutional
structure of "Our Federalism" forbids that decentralization.
Less satisfactory is Choper's justification of judicial protec-
tion of individual liberties against all governmental intrusion.
We are told that the "predominant pattern" (p. 68) of our
history confirms Madison's belief that "invasion of private
rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Govern-
ment contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in
which the Government is a mere instrument of the major
number of its Constituents" (pp. 6o-6i).50 Perhaps so. 5 1 But
we are still left with the important questions of which "private
rights" should be protected, by which organs of government,
and at what level of intensity.52 Judicial scrutiny of legislation
having a specially burdensome impact on discrete and insular
minorities, an approach articulated in United States v. Caro-
46 See J. ELY, supra note 36, at go; L. TRIBE, supra note 43, §§ 17-I to -3. See
also Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the
Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 343-48 (I962) (arguing that bill of
attainder clause reflects the Framers' concern that legislative power be checked).
47 Choper notes the historical connection of separation of powers with liberty
concerns (pp. 263-70): differentiation of power was thought to contribute to liberty.
See P. KURLAND, supra note 22, at I6o. Choper observes that the historical fear was
of legislative, not executive power, and that in this context judicial review did not
figure prominently as a mechanism for control. He omits any discussion of the role
of the jury as a separation of powers mechanism: the jury further diffused authority
because any governmentally imposed sanction would almost certainly be by way of
a criminal prosecution and that needed the concurrence of 12 citizens. The growth
of federal equity jurisdiction and the explosion of administrative law greatly reduce
the role of the citizen in controlling the imposition of sanctions.
48 Choper's careful review (pp. 241-54) shows that the Framers supported feder-
alism at least as much to achieve governmental efficiency as to protect individual
liberty.
49 J. LIVELY, DEMOCRACY 131-45 (1975); M. MARGOLIS, VIABLE DEMOCRACY
170-73 (1979); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970).
50 Quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (G. Hunt ed. 19o4).
s' See generally J. ELY, supra note 36, at 73-179.
52 We are, of course, concerned only with the judicial role. Political scientists
have long understood that there are numerous other mechanisms for protecting against
majoritarian tyranny. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 17-19
(I956).
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lene Products Co.,53 rests on a premise that, while "Our De-
mocracy" contemplates an open political process, these groups
have been excluded. But may judges go further and posit
fundamental "rights" having no basis in the constitutional text
or structure simply because they believe that a "just" consti-
tutional order should guarantee those "rights" against the
"majoritarian political process"? Can courts legitimately con-
strain the outcomes of a fair and open political process by
externally derived principles of political morality? This ques-
tion stands at the very center of recent constitutional theory54
and Professor Choper's failure to discuss the implications of a
pragmatic view of "Our Democracy" in this context (see pp.
73-75) leaves me quite uncertain about the reach of his con-
ception of the judiciary's role in protecting civil liberties.
Moreover, any effort to ground judicial protection of in-
dividual liberties in a fear of the majoritarian political process
needs some qualification. Currently, at least, that process is
not insensitive to claims of individual rights and liberties.
Quite the contrary. The vast bulk of rights and liberties pos-
sessed by the citizens of the United States are the product of
that political process.5 5 Acting under its commerce and spend-
ing powers, and the Civil War amendments, Congress has
established a range of rights and liberties far beyond the con-
stitutional minimums. 56 So, too, have many states.
On the other hand, I think one can underestimate the need
to protect certain rights of the "majority," particularly political
rights. This underestimation is rooted in uncertainty about
the whole concept of the "majoritarian political process."
Modern constitutional theory implicitly views that concept
through the lens of pluralism or interest-group theory.57 But
a strong tradition in political sociology tracing back to Mosca
and Pareto suggests that this presents a distorted image.58
Whatever the form of government, "[in all societies ... two
classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that
is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs
53 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
54 See J. ELY, supra note 36, at 105-34; Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. io63 (1980).
55 For statutory references, see P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HowE & E.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 135-44 (H. Monaghan ed. Supp. xg8o).
56 Choper recognizes this fact (p. 68) but gives it inadequate weight. I am, of
course, prepared to give credit to the Supreme Court for its role in educating the
political process to the need for protecting civil liberties.
S7 Choper follows this tradition, observing that the majority at any one time is
simply the product of shifting and differing combinations of minorities (pp. 44-45).
58 See G. MoscA, THE RULING CLASS (A. Livingston ed. & H. Kahn trans. 1939);
3 V. PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY §§ 2026-2o59 (Dover ed. 1935). See generally
PARETO & MOSCA (J. Meisi ed. 1965).
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all political functions, [and] monopolizes power . . . ."59 On
this view of the political order, so-called "elite" theories of
democracy have surfaced. In substance, these theories urge
that the core of a democratic political order is not majority
rule but an ongoing sense that the rulers are "on probation"
- that is, they can be held accountable for their rule and
periodically divested of their ruling authority. 60 Interest group
and elite theory have some common consequences for judicial
review in "Our Democracy." Suffice it here to say that to the
extent that elite theory provides a valid account of the practical
operation of our political system, 61 constitutional protection for
at least the political liberties of the majority is necessary if the
majority is to succeed in holding its "governors" accountable. 62
In the end, the Court is but one mechanism - an important
one, to be sure - operating in our system of civil liberties.
Its precise role within that system is a perennial problem.
Although Choper may be correct that protection of individual
liberties is the Court's most important obligation, he does not
provide us with a sufficiently theoretical and comprehensive
description of the judicial role. Still, he rightly reminds us
that any comprehensive theory must take account of the short-
comings of our "majoritarian" political process.
IV.
Despite my doubts and disagreements, this comprehensive
and complex book is deeply thought provoking. The ultimate
test of the book is its capacity to stimulate reexamination of
fundamental matters. Measured against that standard, Cho-
per's book gets high marks.
s9 See G. MoSCA, supra note 58, at 5o. Robert Michels generalized this into an
"iron law of oligarchy," a theory that holds that all organizations are eventually taken
over by self-perpetuating elites. R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES (Free Press ed.
2962).
60 The classic exposition is of course J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM
AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. ig5o). Schumpeter attempted to redefine "democracy" as
"that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."
Id. at 269.
61 For an informative introduction to the subject, see K. PREWITT & A. STONE,
THE RULING ELITES (1973).
62 A recent article by Professor Blasi reflects a trace of this view. He notes that
the development of free speech doctrine has been triggered by the claims of minority
groups for input into decisionmaking, but he speculates that in the future the first
amendment will be seen more as a mechanism by which the misuse of government
power can be checked by those "powerful persons, representatives of movements and
institutions that in a realistic sense do serve as counterforces to government." See
Blasi, "Journalistic Autonomy" as a First Amendment Concept, in IN HONOR OF
JUSTICE DOUGLAS 55, 68 (R. Keller ed. 1979).
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RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. Adopted April
14, i98o; Effective June 30, I98O. Pp. ii; 78. Free.1
Reviewed by William H. Allen 2 and Alex Kozinski3
Twentieth century procedure has come slowly to the high-
est court in the land, but come it has. Here as elsewhere, the
vestiges of tradition have given way to the demands of efficient
administration. Gone and unlamented are the admission of all
applicants to the Bar in open court and the writ of certiorari
to correct diminution of the record. So long gone that none
of us remember them are the days of unlimited oral argument,
and even the days when the customary argument was an hour
per side are fading from memory. Moreover, although the
tradition of delivering opinions in open court is retained, the
oral opinions more often than not are quite perfunctory and
not the full-blown opinions of yesterday. In this latest revision
of its rules, the Supreme Court has taken further steps to bring
its practice into the modern era already populated by the lower
federal courts. To those, however, who have felt an arcane
attachment to the more gentlemanly aspects of Supreme Court
practice, which allotted practitioners freedoms - and atten-
dant risks - not enjoyed in other federal courts, the day on
which the new rules went into effect, June 30, i98o, was one
tinged with nostalgia.
The new rules arrived with little fanfare. They had the
immediate effect of depreciating every practitioner's invest-
ment in that authoritative manual of Supreme Court practice,
Stern and Gressman. 4 On the other hand, the new rules gen-
erally clarify what was previously obscure procedure and make
explicit what lawyers who frequently practice before the Court
have known to be required, expected, or at least preferred
form. They are therefore a further welcome step toward cod-
ification of the "common law of procedure" referred to by
former Attorney General Garland at the turn of the century. 5
No longer need the new Supreme Court practitioner puzzle,
Single copies of the rules may be obtained at no charge from the Clerk of the
Court. Multiple copies can be obtained for $2.50 each from Commerce Clearing
House by reference to document number 5175. The rules are also reported at 85
F.R.D. 435 (i98o).
2 Member, District of Columbia Bar.
3 Member, California and District of Columbia Bars.
4 R. STERN & E. GREsSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (5th ed. 1978).
5 A. GARLAND, EXPERIENCE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
WITH SOME REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS AS TO THAT TRIBUNAL 12 (1898),
quoted in R. STERN & E. GRESSmAN, supra note 4, at 18.
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for example, over the way to set up the cover of his brief.
New rule 33.2(a) provides a veritable blueprint for "[a]ll doc-
uments filed with the Court," thereby rendering unnecessary
resort to the briefs of more experienced colleagues for use as
models. From the top of the page, where the number of the
case appears (or where a space is left, when the document
initiates a case), to the bottom, where the designation of the
attorney of record must be given, the rule enumerates all items
that must appear and specifies their order. The new rule
finally settles a question of style that has long divided Supreme
Court practitioners: Where does the case number go? While
many, including the office of the Solicitor General, have fol-
lowed the now required practice of placing the case number
first, other members of the Bar, including no less a Supreme
Court practitioner than Dean (and former Solicitor General)
Griswold, have placed the number third, following the name
of the Court and its Term. The new rule is a vindication of
the former approach.
Regrettably, some other points have not received such el-
egant treatment. The very same rule 33.2(a), for instance,
requires that "the name, post office address, and telephone
number of the member of the Bar of this Court who is counsel
of record for the party concerned" must appear on the front
cover. Quite apart from the novel idea that a telephone num-
ber be stated on a Supreme Court brief, the rule is notably
unhelpful in providing that, when more than one counsel is
listed on the cover, "counsel of record shall be clearly identi-
fied." Nowhere do the rules specify just who qualifies as
"counsel of record."' 6 Nor do they suggest how he or she is to
be designated; th,. only idea that suggests itself, placing an
asterisk next to the name of one attorney and using a footnote
on the front cover to designate him as the counsel of record,
can hardly be viewed as consistent with the otherwise elegant
lines of the cover. 7
Probably the most drastic change in the rules is the im-
position of page limitations on briefs. The old rules, which
placed no such constraints upon petitions, jurisdictional state-
6 The only hint appears to be the phrase "and upon whom service is to be made"
following the term "counsel of record." This might mean that counsel of record is the
attorney to whom service copies are to be provided by the opposing party. However,
from the phrasing of the rule, receipt of service appears to he merely an incident of
being counsel of record, rather than the full measure of that office.
7 In practice the identification requirement has been ignored by many, including
the office of the Solicitor General. See, e.g., Brief of the United States and the
Federal Respondents, Upjohn Co. v. United States, No. 79-886 (U.S., filed Sept. ii,
198o) (seven Department of justice attorneys listed, none designated as counsel of
record).
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ments, and briefs on the merits, made the Court unique among
the federal appellate courts." Perhaps because of the burden
imposed on the Court by lawyers pursuing this freedom, the
new rules set strict page limits for these documents. Thirty
pages are granted for jurisdictional statements, motions to
dismiss or affirm, and petitions for certiorari and responses
thereto (rules 15.3, 16.3, 21.4, 22.2); fifty pages for briefs on
the merits (rule 34.3); twenty pages for amicus briefs pertaining
to petitions for certiorari or jurisdictional statements (rule
36.1); and so on. 9
It would appear that the Court is serious about these page
limits. Unlike some other procedural rules, such as the time
for filing briefs on the merits, which may be waived by the
Clerk alone, a motion for enlargement or waiver of the page
limits may be granted only by the Court or a Justice, upon
motion submitted at least fifteen days before the filing date.
Moreover, "such an application is not favored" (rule 334. t°
While the rule apparently reflects the Court's impatience with
briefs that are too long, one wonders at the wisdom of blanket
page limitations that can be enlarged only through the cum-
bersome procedure of a motion to a Justice or the Court.
Although a page limitation may make some sense with respect
to petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements, once
the Court has decided to grant plenary review, it should be
left to counsel to determine in the exercise of their professional
judgment how best to walk the precarious line between con-
veying a full understanding of their case and losing the reader's
' See FED. R. App. P. 28(g).
9 Rule 33.3 converts these page limits for briefs produced by photostatic repro-
duction of typed copy. Any resourceful counsel who would attempt to circumvent
the limits on typed pages by techniques such as setting margins farther toward the
edge of the page, one-and-a-half spacing, and the use of a typewriter with an uncon-
ventionally small typeface should first take note of the provisions of rule 33.1(c)
(requiring pica type and double spacing) and 33.i(d) (3/4-inch margin on all sides).
Although the assistant clerk in charge of these matters has confessed that he does not
take a ruler to each document to police compliance, the document must at least look
good to the eye and appear to be in general compliance with the rules. Telephone
Conversation with Assistant Clerk, United States Supreme Court (Oct. 15, x98o).
All of these page limits are exclusive of the subject index, table of authorities,
verbatim quotations, and any appendices. In addition, summaries of argument are
apparently not being counted toward the page limits. See, e.g., Brief of Northwest
Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, No. 79-1o56
(U.S., filed Aug. 29, 198o) (53 pages of argument plus three of summary); Brief of the
United States and the Federal Respondents, Upjohn Co. v. United States, No. 79-
886 (U.S., filed Sept. ii, 198o) (44 pages plus seven of summary).
10 The 15-day requirement makes this rule particularly burdensome since few
lawyers prepare briefs sufficiently in advance to be able to predict the number of
pages more than two weeks before the filing deadline.
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attention by burdening him with trivialities. In any event, one
suspects that whatever judicial time is saved by shorter briefs
may be lost in considering and ruling on motions for extension
of the page limits.
Although it can be argued that similar page limitations
have worked well in the courts of appeals," cases that have
been selected for plenary review by the Supreme Court are
likely to be more complex, and certainly more important to
the development of the law, than the run of the mill appellate
case. That, at least, has been the rationale by which the Bar
has been willing to endure unflinchingly the recent prolifera-
tion of Supreme Court decisions containing lengthy explica-
tions of each Justice's particular view of the case.' 2 It can
only be hoped that, as a quid pro quo for the new page
limitations, the Justices will endeavor to introduce into their
opinions the terseness they now demand of counsel and avoid
filling the pages of the United States Reports with essays
reflecting pet interests that have little or no relation to the
question for decision.
13
These changes, particularly the strict page limitations, re-
flect the changing relationship between the Court and its Bar.
Many items heretofore left to the discretion of the Supreme
Court practitioner, with the gentlemanly understanding that
the privilege would not be abused, are now consigned to rule.
Perhaps because so many more lawyers are admitted to prac-
tice before the Court than ever before, the Justices believe this
type of standardization is necessary.
One such standardizing change that is particularly sadden-
ing is rule 33.2(b), which specifies the color of the covers of
printed documents. Under this provision, jurisdictional state-
ments and petitions for certiorari are to be covered in white;
responses to petitions and jurisdictional statements, in light
orange; briefs on the merits, light blue, light red, and yellow;
intervenor or amicus briefs, green; and so on. 14 By specifying
I I However, no one knows how frequently motions for enlargement of page limits
are made in the courts of appeals, and in our experience they are seldom denied.
12 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, No. 78-,007, slip op. (U.S., July 2, 1980) (five
opinions totaling 207 pages); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (six opinions totaling 156 pages); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. i (1976) (six
opinions plus appendix totaling 294 pages); Furman v. Georgia, 4o8 U.S. 238 (1972)
(per curiam order plus nine opinions totaling 233 pages).
13 See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431
U.S. 8W6, 823-38 (1977); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 26o-64 (1972).
14 Curiously enough, in this kaleidoscope of colors, no provision was made for
briefs in opposition to motions to dismiss or affirm, or supplemental briefs, each of
which is specifically authorized by the rules. See rules 16.5, .6, 22.5, .6, 3S-.
Presumably these fall within the catchall provision of the rule, which provides for a
X980]
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not only the color but also the shade to be used, the new rule
will put an end to the use of "firm colors," i.e., adoption by
a firm of a particular color that is used on all of its briefs in
the hope that it will come to be associated in the minds of the
Justices with that firm. 15 The new rule will also prevent other
creative use of color such as that in Washington v. Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,16 a
case involving fishing rights, where the briefs of petitioners,
the Puget Sound Gillnetters Association et al., came appropri-
ately attired in salmon pink.
In addition to these formal touches, the new rules contain
some significant substantive changes. Petitions for writs of
certiorari to review judgments in criminal cases must now be
filed within sixty days after judgment, with a possible thirty-
day extension obtainable from a justice (rule 20. i). Under the
old rule 22, petitions had to be filed within ninety days of a
state criminal judgment with a possible sixty-day extension,
and within thirty days of a federal criminal judgment, with a
possible thirty-day extension. Rules 12.4 and 19.5 now pro-
vide that cross-appeals or cross-petitions for certiorari may be
filed a nonextensible thirty days after receipt of the original
jurisdictional statement or petition. 17 This change is truly
deserving of praise, for it dispenses with the costly and fre-
quently needless task of preparing a cross-petition or cross-
appeal and holding it ready for filing in case a petition or
appeal should be filed by the opposing party at the last min-
ute. 18 The new rules also take away the additional twenty
days given by the 197o Rules to the government to respond to
tan cover for all unspecified documents. On the other hand, it is possible that briefs
in opposition to motions to dismiss or affirm will be considered akin to reply briefs,
and therefore should bear yellow covers.
Is The rule does afford this luxury to the office of the Solicitor General, all of
whose submissions are to be clad in gray. However, the Solicitor General in fact
discontinued the use of the traditional gray cover some time ago, switching to a tan
shade. Apparently valuing its own esthetic judgment over obedience to the new rule,
that office continues to file briefs covered in tan. See, e.g., brief cited note 7 supra,
16 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
17 However, a cross-appeal or cross-petition that is timely only because of these
provisions may not be heard on the merits unless the Court accepts the case for
plenary review on the timely filed appeal or petition of the opposing party (rules 12.4,
20.5).
18 Parties who have been formally designated respondents or appellees, but who
in fact support the position of the petitioner or appellant, now have a nonextensible
20-day period in which to file any pleading (rules 10.4, i9.6). Reply briefs must now
be filed at least one week prior to oral argument, rather than three days (rule 35.3).
A petition for an extraordinary writ no longer need (but at counsel's discretion, still
may) be prefaced by a motion for leave to file the petition (rule 27.1).
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petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional statements. 19 Perhaps
the Court found that the office of the Solicitor General was no
more timely in filing responses under the fifty-day limit than
under the thirty-day one.
The rules for filing and service of documents have also
undergone some substantive changes. Rule 28.2 now provides
that documents not received by the Clerk within the specified
period are deemed to be timely filed if mailed within the time
allowed for filing, provided that a notarized statement signed
by a member of the Bar of the Court is filed with the Clerk,
certifying and setting forth the details of the mailing. 20 The
old rules contained a limited mall-in procedure, applicable only
in the case of petitions for certiorari to review federal criminal
judgments originally arising in outlying district courts such as
Guam or Alaska. 21  Rule 28.4(c), reflecting a statutory
change, 22 now requires service of process upon the attorney
general of a state in any proceeding to which the state or its
agents are not parties when the constitutionality of a state
statute is called into question, much in the way the rules have
long required service upon the Solicitor General when a federal
statute was challenged (rule 28. 4 (b)).
The new rules also contain miscellaneous changes that clar-
ify matters previously obscure, or codify practices already in
existence. Rule 7 settles the meaning of the two-year prohib-
ition on practice before the Supreme Court by law clerks and
other court personnel, by specifying that this means "partici-
pat[ion], by way of any form of professional consultation or
assistance, in any case before this Court" (emphasis added).23
Another question that has arisen from time to time is whether
an amicus may file a reply brief. Rule 36.2 now answers this
in the negative. The same rule also specifies that amicus briefs
must identify the party whose position is supported. Rule 44.4
now specifies the items to be presented in an application for
19 Compare old rule i6.i with new rules i6.i, 22.1. The new rules also delete the
special treatment theoretically afforded to motions for oral argument by government
amici curiae. Compare rule 38.7 with old rule 44.7. However, the Solicitor General,
along with state and local government counsel, may still file amicus briefs without
obtaining the consent of the parties (rule 36.4).
20 Use of the mail-in procedure requires use of the United States mails. Use of a
private courier service will not secure the benefit of this rule. Indeed, it is not clear
whether use of a commercial courier - as opposed to a special messenger who
personally delivers the documents - can ever constitute effective service under this
rule.
21 See old rule 22.2.
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 24 03(b) (1976).
23 The rule extends this prohibition, previously applicable only to clerks and
secretaries of Justices, to all Court personnel.
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a stay, which include a copy of the judgment or opinion to be
reviewed and the order, if any, denying relief below. 24
Among the changes that give official recognition to existing
practice are rule 23.1, which specifies that the Court may
dispose of cases on petition for certiorari by summary dispo-
sition on the merits, and rule 37.2, which provides that cases
will commence being called on the first, rather than the second,
Monday of each Term. Similarly, rule 29.3 codifies the now
accepted practice of seeking extensions of time for filing of
briefs on the merits and certain other documents by letter to
the Clerk, rather than by formal motion, and rule 54 includes
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the definition of
the term "state court." Two conforming changes pertain to
the standard for granting certiorari. New rule 17, replacing
the familiar old rule 19, omits as one of the bases for certiorari
that the decision of a federal court of appeals resolves "an
important state or territorial question in a way in conflict with
applicable state or territorial law." Doubtless this reflects the
Court's general distaste for diversity jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the new rule recognizes as a basis for certiorari a conflict
on a question of federal law between a state court of last resort
and a federal appellate court, or among state courts of last
resort.
The new rules also have taken account of changing times
by significantly increasing the various fees charged by the
Court. Rule 45 now doubles the cost for docketing a case to
$200, to be increased to $300 when argument is permitted.
The fee for admission to the Bar has been quadrupled to $ioo
(rule 45(e)). 25 And, whether as a revenue-raising measure or
24 Rule 33.5(a) provides that all "documents" exceeding five pages shall be preceded
by a table of contents, unless they contain only one item. Similarly, rule 33.5(b)
requires documents exceeding three pages to contain a table of authorities. Although
stay applications and other motions are clearly to be considered documents under rule
33, see rule 33.6, the Clerk's office has taken the position that stay applications will
be accepted whether or not preceded by tables of contents or tables of authorities.
See Application for a Stay, Moore v. Brown, No. A-195 (U.S., filed Aug. 28, ig8o).
25 Lest anyone suspect that this $75 difference is considered trivial by today's
reputedly overpaid attorney, it is reported that during May and June the resources of
the Clerk's office were severely strained by a flood of 4,oo0 applications from attorneys
eager to gain admission at the $25 bargain rate. Telephone Conversation, supra note
9.
It should be noted that admission to practice before the Court is more important
under the new rules than under the old. As noted earlier, only a member of the
Court's Bar may take advantage of the mail-in procedure for filing documents. See
p. 317 supra. In addition, while old rule 47.2 provided that applications made
before a case has been docketed (e.g., motions for extension of time to file petitions
for certiorari) "must be signed . . . by the party or by counsel but . . . such counsel
nebd not be a member of the bar of this court," new rule 39.2 specifies that such
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as a probably futile attempt at deterrence, petitions for re-
hearing now must be accompanied by a filing fee of $50.
One other change merits discussion, not because of how
much it accomplishes, but how little. Rule 30.7, dealing with
the filing of joint appendices in cases in which plenary review
has been granted, now contains a provision permitting the
filing of the appendix used in the court below "if it conforms
to the requirements of this Rule." The joint appendix, which
must be filed in virtually every case argued on the merits,
generally involves hundreds of pages of custom printing at a
cost of thousands of dollars. The prospect of simply filing the
appendix used below therefore seemed like an eminently rea-
sonable idea, but this could not be done under the old rules
because of differing requirements as to document size. 26 The
new rule offered the hope that the Court would now accept
the oversize appendices typically used in the lower courts. Yet
this hope was dashed in one stroke by the Clerk's office, which
informed us that rule 3o's reference to rule 33, which specifies
document dimensions, would be interpreted as incorporating
those dimensional constraints into "this Rule" - rendering the
oversized court of appeals appendices still unacceptable for
Supreme Court use. 27
No book review would be complete without a few stylistic
comments. Almost every one of the rules has been rewritten
somewhat, even where no substantive changes have been
made. For example, rules i5.i(g) and 21.i(g), dealing with
jurisdictional statements and petitions for certiorari, now ital-
icize the word "concise" when exhorting attorneys to be brief
in their statement of the case. (Curiously, the parallel "con-
cise" in rule 34. i(g), dealing with the statement of the case in
briefs on the merits, was left unitalicized.) A rather cryptic
change is reflected in the new rule 17. Old rule i9 provided
that "[a] review on writ of certiorari is not a matter or right,
but of sound judicial discretion" (emphasis added). The new
rule is identical, except that the italicized word is conspicu-
motions must be signed by counsel of record. Although "counsel of record" is a
nebulous concept, see note 6 supra, it would seem at least to require membership in
the Bar of the Court. Finally, the old rules were silent as to whether a petition for
an extraordinary writ could be filed by a lawyer not a member. Rule 27.1 now
specifies that an appearance of counsel form must be filed at the time of filing a
petition for an extraordinary writ, and this form may be filed only by a member of
the Court's Bar.
26 Court of appeals appendices are normally reproduced by photocopying the
relevant documents in a volume 8 x ii inches in size, see FED. R. APP. P. 32(a),
while all documents filed in the Supreme Court must be 6Vs x 7V8 inches.
27 Telephone Conversation, supra note 9.
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ously omitted. Although the uncharitable reader might infer
from this that henceforth the Court will exercise arbitrary and
capricious - rather than sound - discretion in ruling on these
petitions, we prefer to think that the rewording serves merely
to remedy a redundancy.
In a few instances, however, the Court appears to have
been somewhat carried away with clarifying its intentions.
Rule 38, dealing with oral argument, is a good example. The
Court has not only added the exhortation that "Counsel should
assume that all Members of the Court have read the briefs in
advance of argument," but immediately following has thought
it necessary to italicize the admonition that "[t]he Court looks
with disfavor on any oral argument that is read from a prepared
text" (rule 38.1). And, in what can only be characterized as
an overabundance of caution, rule 38.3 now informs counsel
that they are "not required to use all the allotted time" for oral
argument. Finally, the new rules have taken to capitalizing
the terms Court, Justice, Clerk, Bar, etc. While this no doubt
reflects the proper respect for these institutions, there is some-
thing to be said for the understated elegance of the old rules,
where the terms were in lower case. 28
Altogether it must be concluded that the Court has done
an admirable job of revising its rules. Generally, the rules
clarify and simplify the practice before the Court. We are
happy to say that the changes in wording are also, for the
most part, salutary; as far as rules can be, the new rules are
readable and easy to follow. Although we have pointed out
some potential problems, only time and experience will show
whether the new procedures are workable. The Court has
shown a willingness to reconsider rule changes that have
proven unworkable or ineffective. One hopes that it will con-
tinue to do so should problems develop with these most recent
reforms.
28 But see A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 25-28 (12th ed. 1976) (mandating
capitalization of "Court," "Term," and "Justice," inter alia).
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